The Suppression of Argument

The New Vestments: One Side Fits All

This is the final post in a four-part series on the suppression of speech in America. In Part 1, I argued that this previously unimaginable sea change in our national ethos has been predicated largely on the assertion that disinformation is endangering our society, and that the suppression of speech is therefore necessary for our safety. However, this assertion is refuted by John Stuart Mill in Chapter 2 of his monumental work On Liberty, where he argues convincingly that harm comes not from unfettered speech, but from the suppression of the same. In Part 2 and Part 3, respectively, we considered the suppression of truthful dissent from falsehood and erroneous dissent from truth. Now in this post, we discuss the remaining possibility, when a received opinion and an opposing viewpoint are each partially true and partially false.

Parts of the Whole

One of the main reasons that a diversity of opinions is advantageous, according to Mill, is that in the vast majority of cases, opposing opinions “share the truth between them.” There are relatively few instances in which one side of the argument is completely correct and the other side completely wrong. When opposing viewpoints are a mixture of truth and error, “the nonconforming opinion is needed to supply the remainder of the truth, of which the received doctrine embodies only a part.”

There is a universal tendency to see one’s viewpoint as embodying the full truth, when in fact it almost always contains only part of the truth. The typical pattern is that as another partial truth arises, it supplants the previously dominant viewpoint rather than co-mingling with it. Given this partial character of prevailing opinions, opposing viewpoints are precious because they often contain some portion of truth lacking in the received opinion, even though the latter may be mixed with error or falsehood.

[Any sober judge of human affairs] will think that so long as popular truth is one-sided, it is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should have one-sided asserters too; such being usually the most energetic, and the most likely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole.

This dynamic can be discerned throughout history and in his own day, Mill argues. One example he gives is that of Rousseau’s ideas “exploding like bombshells in the midst” of 18th century Europe. Even though, in Mill’s estimation, Rousseau was further from the truth than those he argued against, there was in his writings “a considerable amount of exactly those truths which the popular opinion wanted.”

Ideas such as “the superior worth of simplicity of life, the enervating and demoralising effect of the trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society” remain as a salutary deposit to the present day. Likewise, it is common among all societies that political parties serve a helpful function in their assertion of diametrically opposite viewpoints on a variety of issues, as each “mode of thinking derives its utility from the deficiencies of the other.”

Unless opinions favourable to democracy and to aristocracy, to property and to equality, to co-operation and to competition, to luxury and to abstinence, to sociality and individuality, to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of practical life, are expressed with equal freedom, and enforced and defended with equal talent and energy, there is no chance of both elements obtaining their due; one scale is sure to go up and the other down.

Since so few of us are capable of holding in our minds a viewpoint sufficiently broad to encompass the whole truth on whatever matter we consider, progress can usually only be made “by the rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners.” It is not merely by the suppression of viewpoints that censorship does grave harm to a society, but through the removal of the possibility for interaction among opposing viewpoints.

There will always be prevailing opinions that dominate and eclipse opposing viewpoints, but dissenters from the established opinions almost always have something useful to say. “Only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a chance of fair-play to all sides of the truth.”

The Steel Man

Perhaps someone thinks that their viewpoint is more than a partial truth, that there are some ideas which are of critical importance to society and so near to containing the whole truth that they need not degrade their utility by interacting with erroneous arguments merely to harvest that minuscule fraction of truth they are missing. Mill responds to this objection with a “steel man” argument particularly adapted to readers in Victorian England. Is it not the case that Christianity, in the eyes of its adherents, contains the whole truth? Can it not be presented as at least one instance in which there is no further truth to be gleaned from a prevailing viewpoint’s interaction with other views? And if this is true of Christianity, could there be other examples?

Mill replies that even Christianity, considered on its own terms and embraced as true, does not negate his argument.¹ The sayings of Christ “are irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensive morality requires…” and “everything which is excellent in ethics may be brought within them…” Yet, he maintains, “it is quite consistent with this, to believe that they contain, and were meant to contain, only a part of the truth; that many essential elements of the highest morality are among the things which are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for.”

For my part, although I deplore much of the bitter harvest we have reaped from postmodern ways of construing reality and our manner of perceiving it, I embrace much of its critique of modernity. In the context of Mill’s assertion, I’m thinking of the pretended ability of the modern mind to wrap itself comprehensively around large conceptual chunks of the universe. What is the censor’s suppression of arguments against received opinions but a perspicuous example of a totalizing discourse, that habit of mind through which modern man has repeatedly impoverished and beclowned himself? Mill would have none of this, and neither should we.

The exclusive pretension made by a part of the truth to be the whole, must and ought to be protested against… There is always hope when people are forced to listen to both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being exaggerated into falsehood… Truth has no chance but in proportion as every side of it, every opinion which embodies any fraction of the truth, not only finds advocates, but is so advocated as to be listened to.

An Unfair Fight

Mill concludes the chapter with a brief coda examining the objection that it is legitimate and salutary to suppress speech when it is intemperate or “passes the bounds of fair discussion.” Although the censorship rationale being touted today is focused on content rather than the manner of expression, Mill makes an observation about the handling of intemperate speech that is relevant to this discussion.

He begins by noting the near impossibility of “fixing the boundaries” for an acceptable manner of discourse.

If the test be offence to those whose opinion is attacked, I think experience testifies that this offence is given whenever the attack is telling and powerful, and that every opponent who pushes them hard, and whom they find it difficult to answer, appears to them, if he shows any strong feeling on the subject, an intemperate opponent.

Furthermore, it will be difficult to convince someone accused of intemperate argument in the most serious instances of it, because they’re not likely to see them as such. In Mill’s view, offenses such as sophistic argument, the suppression of facts, incorrectly framing the issue, or incorrectly representing the argument of one’s opponent, are so often committed in good faith by persons who are lacking neither competence nor knowledge that they cannot reasonably be charged as morally culpable.² Nevertheless, he observes, “the denunciation of these weapons would deserve more sympathy if it were ever proposed to interdict them equally to both sides.”

In fact, he argues, intemperate or unfair manners are generally forbidden to dissenters from the prevailing opinion, and not to defenders of the same. Furthermore, the employment of such methods in support of the consensus viewpoint will not merely be tolerated, but are “likely to obtain for him who uses them the praise of honest zeal and righteous indignation.” The advantages to be gained by demonizing the other side accrue almost exclusively to received opinions.

The worst offence of this kind which can be committed by a polemic, is to stigmatise those who hold the contrary opinion as bad and immoral men. To calumny of this sort, those who hold any unpopular opinion are peculiarly exposed, because they are in general few and uninfluential, and nobody but themselves feel much interest in seeing justice done them; but this weapon is, from the nature of the case, denied to those who attack a prevailing opinion: they can neither use it with safety to themselves, nor, if they could, would it do anything but recoil on their own cause.

This observation is highly relevant to our situation today, not with respect to the manner of speaking, but regarding the content of dissenting speech, as noted above. In the interest of truth, we should be especially concerned to preserve and maintain dissenting voices, but the censor would have them silenced. More than this, there are voices vehemently urging civil and criminal penalties for the “crime” of voicing opinions that happen to be held by our enemies and adversaries, or are otherwise disfavored by the prevailing authorities—whether elected, appointed to obscure and unaccountable positions, or self-proclaimed experts.

The bottom line is that the suppression of speech in America today is not serving the interests of truth. It is rather designed to preserve the interests of a ruling elite, who cannot maintain their position unless they are the only ones speaking.

Conclusion

We began by noting that arguments for the suppression of speech in America today are offered in bad faith. It is assumed rather than argued that disinformation can be readily identified, and there is not the slightest attempt to offer a neutral method for identifying it. The instances of so-called disinformation that have been and are being targeted are opinions that challenge the legitimacy and truthfulness of those seeking to suppress them. The conflict of interest is so glaringly obvious that the censors’ failure to even mention it is further evidence of their malfeasance.

A common tactic is to label dissenting opinions as conspiracy theories, in an attempt to have them ruled out of court, thus preventing a hearing of their claims. More than a few of these so-called conspiracy theories have been acknowledged subsequently as true by those who previously labeled them conspiracy theories, and in many cases vilified and persecuted those who advanced them. There are additional conspiracy theories still awaiting their vindication, and an informed observer can rest in the confidence that the vindication process will continue.

Much harm has been done by the suppression of information and opinion, and it is telling that this harm is almost never acknowledged by those who perpetrated it.³ This is particularly execrable in light of the fact that the suppression of speech is being advanced on the premise that it is necessary to keep us all safe. The chief focus of this series has been to undercut that argument, and with the help of John Stuart Mill, I believe it has been discredited entirely.

Mill destroys the very concept of harmful disinformation by proving that the act of suppression carries far more weight than the question of whether the suppressed opinion is true or not. He demonstrated this conclusively by considering each of the mutually exclusive cases that every act of suppression must fall into, with respect to the truthfulness of a received opinion and a dissent from it. In each case, we saw that the interests of society are served not by suppressing either opinion, but by ensuring freedom of expression and strenuously promoting and encouraging the interchange of ideas.

To the extent that those who are seeking to implement and maintain a censorship regime are doing so to advance their interests, rather than promote the good of society and advance the interests of truth, the foregoing will not convince them.⁴ My hope is rather that this extended analysis of Mill’s argument will interdict their deceptive argument and expose it as such. I think this series has not been an easy read, and I appreciate and commend those who have persevered to the end of it.

Perhaps I’m preaching to the choir, and many or all of my readers were already wise to the censors’ game. In any case, the importance of this issue can hardly be overstated, and there is much at stake in this critical inflection point in the history of freedom. It is my hope that the clarity of Mill’s thought strengthens your resolve and equips you for the defense of our threatened liberty.

1. Mill offered this steel man argument as one who had respect for the moral tenets of Christianity, but neither professed faith in Christ nor subscribed to the core beliefs of the Christian faith. He dissented strenuously from the prevailing social norms in Victorian England, which he found generally oppressive and stifling.

2. The assumption regarding the good faith of one’s opponents, as well as imputing to them competence and adequate knowledge, seems to be almost entirely missing in our society today. But this difference does not detract from Mill’s argument, because his point is just that each side in a conflict of ideas is unlikely to see the deficiencies in their own manner and methods.

3. I say almost as a concession to the limitations of my knowledge. I’m not aware of a single instance where such harm has been acknowledged by one who perpetrated it and continues to advocate viewpoint suppression. I’m aware of two cases, in particular, in which medical professionals, having been “red-pilled” on the COVID psyop, have aknowledged and apologized for the harm they caused and repented of their previous support for viewpoint suppression.

4. I suspect the number of those advocating censorship with good faith motives is exceeedingly small. Pesenting the arguments offered in ths post to the typical censhorship advocate is probably akin to presenting the title of your vehicle to a carjacker as he waves you out of the driver seat with his gun.